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The Theory and Practice of
Constitutionalism in Pre-Revolutionary
Massachusetts Bay: James Otis on the
Writs of Assistance, 1761
David Thomas Konig*
The subject of constitutionalism is of considerable topical impor-
tance in Canada today, and it is hoped that this essay in historical
jurisprudence will be of value to Canadian scholars attempting to
discover a usable past in the eighteenth century constitution of Empire.
To plunge twentieth century scholars into the eighteenth century
legal world, however, may have a tortious quality to it. Recently, an
American scholar commented rather grimly that much modern scholar-
ship on the subject shares "a sense of the strangeness of the eighteenth-
century world, its pervasive differentness from the legal world we know
and have internalized. We cannot," he concluded, "with any expectation
of success pretend to be a judge in a court in provincial America.... I
We can, perhaps, pretend to be a student or practitioner in provincial
America, for the texts from which provincial American lawyers learned
the law are well known and accessible, and their minutes of cases are
often also available. The published Diary and Autobiography of John
Adams reveals his own attempts to master the subject in the following
recitation of sources:
Wood. Coke. 2 Vols. Lillies Ab[ridgemen]t. 2 Vols. Salk[eld's]
Rep[orts]. Swinburne. Hawkins Pleas of the Crown. Fortescue.
Fitzgibbons. Ten Volumes in folio I read at Worcester, quite thro.'
Adams also read Justinian, Finch, Hale, "and some Reporters, Cases in
Chancery, Andrews, &c." Yet the result was neither coherent nor easily
assimilated. "All this series of Reading," he confessed in 1760, two years
after passing the bar and commencing his practice, "has left but faint
impressions, and [a] very Imperfect system of law in my Head."
2
* David T. Konig, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of History, Washington University, St.
Louis, Missouri.
1. H. Hartog, "Distancing Oneself from the Eighteenth Century," in Law in the
American Revolution and the Revolution in the Law, ed. H. Hartog (New York,'
1981), pp. 256-257.
2. L. Butterfield, ed., Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, 4 vols. (Cambridge,
Mass., 1962), 1:173-174 [hereinafter Adams, Diary].
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Such a "system" would eventually emerge in his belaboured head
after several more years of practice, for any "system" that existed in
provincial law could not be easily codified or articulated. The reason
was not, however, that there existed "a peculiar confusion in the Ameri-
can mind about the nature of law," nor that American law was
"confused and chaotic."' 3 Rather, the "system" of provincial American
law was less a manageable body of principles that could be studied and
assimilated than it was a framework of procedural arrangements within
various institutional settings. As such, it was not obscure; on the
contrary, such procedures and institutional arrangements were well
known to those who participated in the legal and political systems of
Massachusetts Bay. In fact, it was as unnecessary as it was impossible to
codify or articulate the general contours of provincial law. Deeply held
and based on essentially unspoken assumptions about the "nature of
law," they could remain unarticulated precisely because they were so
widely and implicitly shared. To Adams, who by 1770 had had enough
acquaintance with the legal system to be less confused than the neophyte
lawyer of a decade earlier, virtually all cases before the Massachusetts
Bay courts were implicitly understood by common jurors. Perhaps one
case in a thousand "would confound a common Jury," he admitted, but
in all others,
The general Rules of Law and common Regulations of Society,
under which ordinary Transactions arrange themselves, are well
enough known to ordinary Jurors. The great Principles of the
Constitution, are intimately known, they are sensibly felt by every
Briton-it is scarcely extravagant to say, they are drawn in and
imbibed with the Nurses Milk and first Air.4
Adams was not making this point to defend any substantive
doctrine in law, but to assert the right of ajury to return a general verdict
and to find against the instructions of the court. As such, his argument-
which was, despite his protestations, rather "extravagant"-concerned
a procedure that he felt was essential to "our Constitution of civil
Government." Such a power of the jury was thus a constitutional prin-
ciple, in the sense that the free jury was one of several institutions that
"constitute" the government. Together with "the Power of the People in
Legislation," the popular power of the jury to act "in the Execution of
Lawes" was essential to protecting British liberties against the encroach-
ments of power.5
To eighteenth century Americans this restraint of centralized,
3. G. Wood, The Creation oftheAmerican Republic, 1776-1787(Chapel Hill, 1969), pp.
292, 295.
4. Adams, Diary, supra, note 2, vol. 2, p. 5.
5. Id., p. 3.
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concentrated power was the central issue in constitutionalism. Since the
1960s the historical literature on this struggle between power and liberty
has taken some long strides forward. Beginning in 1965, when Bernard
Bailyn published his "General Introduction" to the Pamphlets of the
American Revolution, this issue has remained at the centre of the
historiographical treatment of the Revolution. 6 The idea of "power" as a
threat to "liberty," he found, was not a new one to Americans in the
middle of the eighteenth century, for it had existed-at least "in partial
form"-in Anglo-American thought since the beginning of the century.
Like many intellectual currents in provincial America, constitutional
thought had a somewhat retardataire quality to it, and, while the ideol-
ogy of opposition to centralized power waned in England, it remained in
full force in America. Indeed-and we also have Bailyn to thank for this
additional insight-the conditions of politics in the colonies produced a
reality that gave meaning to the old ideology and propelled it forward.
Provincial royal governors, possessing significantly greater legal powers
than did the monarchy, consistently attempted to use those powers to
expand their influence. Lacking, however, the patronage powers
wielded by Walpolean parliamentary managers, they had to confront
provincial politicians in a much more overt manner, pitting their
executive powers openly against the constitutional powers of other
governmental institutions.
7
Resisting what Americans called such "encroachments" was thus
the major factor conditioning the provincial understanding of constitu-
tionalism. It was an eternal truth, John Adams believed, that "the love
of power" "has always prompted the princes and nobles of the earth by
every species of fraud and violence to shake off all the limitations of their
power," and "it is the same that has always stimulated the common
people to aspire at independence and to endeavor at confining the power
of the great within the limits of equity and reason."8 In a steady and
consistent way, responding in an ad hoc manner to the various steps
taken by royal governors to increase their "influence," provincial
Americans gradually institutionalized their defensive habits and came
to regard them as constituting the customary-and therefore guaran-
teed-elements of government. In short, such practices became what
6. B. Bailyn, ed., The Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1776, vol. 1:
1750-1765 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965) [hereinafter Bailyn Pamphlets]. This interpre-
tation is set forth in Bailyn's general introduction, entitled "The Transforming
Radicalism of the American Revolution." It was published in expanded form as The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).
7. B. Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), originally
given as the Colver Lectures at Brown University in 1965 and first published in (1967),
1 Perspectives in American History.
8. J. Adams, "A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law" (1774), in Political
Writings of John Adams, ed. G. Peek, Jr. (New York, 1954), p. 4 [hereinafter Adams,
Dissertation].
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Adams meant by the term "our Constitution of civil Government." 9
Massachusetts Bay by 1774 may have had only seventy to eighty practic-
ing lawyers, but that same year Adams was able to say that "we are all of
us lawyers,"' 0 for he well knew that participation in the process of
thwarting "encroachments" was a process shared in widely by the
inhabitants of the province through a variety of techniques and insti-
tutions.
On the most basic level, it might even be "extra-institutional," in the
terminology of Pauline Maier, who has studied most closely behaviour
once thought to be mere random mob violence. Throughout the eight-
eenth century provincial Americans used collective violence to check
actions of the royal government that they regarded as illegal. Mob
action was taken against naval impressment and customs enforcement,
and it often had the tacit or even overt assistance of local officials. John
Adams, for one, viewed such actions as "justifyed, in Opposition to
Attacks upon the Constitution." So widespread and predictable had
they become, in fact, that some in England could assert that "rioting is
an essential part of our constitution," while in 1768 Thomas Hutchinson
(then lieutenant governor and chief justice of the Superior Court of
Judicature) confessed that "Mobs, a sort of them at least, are consti-
tutional.""
Of more undoubted constitutionality were the practices of
individuals to control the judicial process. Through a variety of devices
they sought the "legal restraint of power" as a method of limiting the
force exercised by governments generally. 2 A citizen aggrieved by town
policy, for instance, had many avenues of challenging it through the
courts. Since many powers of local government had to be enforced in
court-not by the towns themselves, which lacked the institutions to do
this-an arena in which to challenge town political powers was readily
available. So, too, for the inhabitant who felt wronged by a perceived
abuse of power and wanted to counter it: By claiming that the act of an
official had been performed in such a way as to be actionable, he could
sue in a common law action for damages.' 3
9. Adams, Diary, supra, note 2, vol. 2, p. 3.
10. J. Murrin, "The Legal Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century
Massachusetts," in Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development, ed.
J. Murrin and S. Katz (3rd ed. New York, 1983), p. 540 at 554; Adams, Dissertation,
supra, note 8, p. 12.
11. L.K. Wroth and H. Zobel, eds., Legal Papers of John Adams, 3 vols. (Cambridge,
Mass., 1965), 1:140 [hereinafter Adams, LegalPapers]. P. Maier, From Resistance to
Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to
Britain, 1765-1776 (paperback ed., New York, 1974), p. 24.
12. The term is best described by the person coining it, W. Nelson, in "The Legal Restraint
of Power in Pre-Revolutionary America: Massachusetts as Case Study, 1760-1775"
(1974), 18 A. J. Legal Hist. and expanded in the same author's The Americanization of
the Common Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1975) [hereinafter Nelson, Americanization].
13. Nelson, Americanization, supra, note 12, p. 7.
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Judges could not be controlled in this precise way, for they enjoyed
an absolute immunity at common law for their official actions. Never-
theless, there existed ways to restrain them. The doctrine of precedent
narrowed judicial discretion, and, in the approving words of John
Adams, "left nothing, or but little to the arbitrary Will or uninformed
Reason of Prince or Judge." In addition, pleading was conducted in
such a way as to bring cases under the general issue for thejury to decide,
rather than under a special plea presenting a question of law that
permitted a judge alone to decide the case. Juries assumed a large share
of the courts' powers in this way and were not reluctant even to find law
as well as fact. The instructions ofjudges sitting en banc could be contra-
dictory, and, in the words of the scholar who has examined the process
most ably, "brief and compressed," or not given at all. In sum, the
provincial judiciary was very much limited by the reality of its situation;
though not controlled by any formal, codified set of restrictions, they
were nonetheless controlled by practice and procedure serving the same
purpose. 14
Legislators, too, were controlled by practice developed out of the
habits of distrust toward government. Since the first establishment of
representative assemblies in Massachusetts, legislators had been much
more like advocates or agents than independent actors. The Massa-
chusetts deputy was seen as the delegated agent of his constituency and
was very often expressly bound to follow the will of his constituents
through a system of written "town mandates." Should he fail to follow
these clear instructions he might be summarily recalled in mid-session.15
Each of these arrangements-whether "extra-institutional,"
judicial, or political-was an element of the "Constitution of civil
Government" in pre-revolutionary Massachusetts Bay. They were part
of the unspoken understanding of law and constitutionalism well before
the imperial crisis, and they developed without reference to parliamen-
tary interference directed specifically at the colonies. By 1765 American
law and constitutionalism would enter a new phase quite different from
that of the earlier eighteenth century; the pre-revolutionary constitution
as understood by provincial Englishmen in Massachusetts Bay would be
14. Id., pp. 10-20. For a contrast with the English situation, where a judge "would
provisionally refuse to enter a verdict that displeased him, reinstruct the jury, and
require it to redeliberate," see J. Langbein, "The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers"
(1978), 45 University of California at Los Angeles Law Review 263 at 291-295.
Although actual practice in England at that time conformed to Langbein's descrip-
tion, there existed at least a theoretical justification for a jury's independence.
Blackstone-an unlikely advocate of American resistance to crown law, given his
views on parliamentary omnipotence-boasted that English law was humane because
juries might commit "pious perjury" to mitigate the rigours of the law. W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1765-1769), p. 238.
15. K. Colegrove, "New England Town Mandates" (1919), 21 Publications of the
Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 411 at 425.
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subjected to new and different shocks, and resistance would be forced
onto a much different plane-that of "natural law." But before that date
the "Constitution of our civil Government" had little need of any but
procedural guarantees. It is that particular body of procedures that this
essay is attempting to understand. For much the better part of the
eighteenth century they stood sufficient to protect American liberties,
and it was in their defence that Americans first began to take serious
exception to Acts of Parliament. These procedures have been called
"whig law" as part of a peculiarly American constitution. The closest
general study we have of them is a trilogy of books by John Phillip Reid.
Though the subtitles of each of his three books on this subject refer to
the "Coming of the American Revolution," Reid argues that by the
middle of the eighteenth century Americans already had developed their
own corpus of "whig law" and their own "constitution." From the
American perspective these ideas were not at all new but were, instead,
the hallowed products of the seventeenth century revolutions and
embodied seventeenth century notions of a government restrained by
custom. These principles eschewed the use of force in government and
denied any innovations that equated "law" with "command" or
"necessity." For the eighteenth century British Empire, on the other
hand, law had to be founded on the will of Parliament. The gap between
British and American notions was vast. By the middle of the eighteenth
century Americans had developed, grown accustomed to, and imple-
mented their own notion of what Reid calls "whig law," which was
ancient and immemorial custom, "beyond the reach of historical
memory," and "supported by most of the local institutions of govern-
ment ... ." For Americans, this "law" and the "constitution" were the
same, and they were immutable. For the British, they were subject to the
will of Parliament and might be changed as state necessity required.1
6
Reid's lawyerly exposition of the skilful use made of legal forms by
Massachusetts Bay Whigs enlarges significantly our understanding of
how law operated in pre-revolutionary New England. But if we now
know how such Whigs protected their constitution, we still do not
know precisely what, in a positive sense, were the fundamental prin-
16. Reid's books are In a Defiant Stance: The Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay,
the Irish Comparison, and the Coming of the American Revolution (University Park,
Pennsylvania, 1977) [hereinafter Reid, Defiant Stance]; In a Rebellious Spirit: The
Argument of Facts, the "Liberty" Riot, and the Coming of the American Revolution
(University Park, Pennsylvania, 1979); and In Defiance of the Law: The Standing-
Army Controversy, the Two Constitutions, and the Coming ofthe American Revolu-
tion (Chapel Hill, 198 1) [hereinafter Reid, Defiance]. In 1923, C. McIlwain referred to
this conflict as "one of the historical phases of the age-old antagonism between the
ideas of law as truth and law as will" in The American Revolution: A Constitutional
Interpretation (1923 orig. ed. New York, 1958), p. 46 [hereinafter McIlwain]. And, of
course, in the thirteenth century Bracton, in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus
Angliae had described it as the difference between gubernaculum and jurisdictio.
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ciples of law that they were protecting from "encroachment." Reid
himself admits this problem in the most recent of his three books. Even if
we know that Americans were protecting their own version of what law
had been in seventeenth century England, he observes, "What law was
in seventeenth-century England is today a harder question than what it
was not."
17
Indeed it is. There is no simple or unchallengeable answer, for
procedures that limit are, by their very nature, more easily understood
by what they exclude than by what they include. But perhaps there is a
method that will move us toward a more complete understanding of
what "law" meant and included. As a general term, "law" embodied
certain things that gave it legitimacy and justified adherence to it. These
legitimizing features were, on first examination, no less vague: They
include ancient customary law, reason (according to St. German), "the
perfection of reason" (according to Coke), the common law, funda-
mental law, or natural law, all of which were "engrafted into the British
constitution."' 8 By themselves, these terms do not move us any closer to
an understanding of law and constitutionalism in pre-revolutionary
Massachusetts Bay. But it is proposed here to examine the term
"constitution" through its specific and purposeful use in the courtroom
to see what positive idea or institution it was protecting rather than
simply accepting its use to define what it was not.
This method involves the close examination of the text and context
of a particular case-for the present purposes, James Otis' argument in
the famous "Writs of Assistance" case of 1761. A particular case
presents major methodological advantages. In the first place, a legal
argument involves a precision of language and terminology not always
found in polemical tracts written to arouse a mass public. In addition,
the rules of common law pleading were strict and closely governed how a
case was to proceed. Judges, though they may not have been able
actively to push a case toward the end they sought, were not absolutely
passive either, and they had some defensive tools of their own. One was
the power to halt a particular line of argumentation that displeased
them. If Tory or otherwise sympathetic to the crown, they might do as
Judge John Cushing did in 1766 to John Adams. "He interrupted me,"
Adams recalled, "-stopped me short, snapd me up.--'Keep to the
Evidence-keep to the point-dont ramble all over the World to
ecclesiastical Councils-dont misrepresent the Evidence."' Thomas
Hutchinson, the chiefjustice presiding at the Superior Court hearing on
granting the writs of assistance in 1761, did the same to Adams in 1769
when Adams tried to raise the issue of "the Law of Nature" in another
trial. Abruptly stopped by the chief justice, Adams later remarked,
17. Reid, Defiant Stance, p. 66; Reid, Defiance, p. 47, supra, note 16.
18. McIlwain, supra, note 16, p. 149.
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"Never in my whole life have I been so disappointed, so mortified, so
humiliated as in that trial."19 Finally, because we know that common
law pleading was so precise as to be stultifying, we also know that points
of argument could be made on extremely narrow grounds to achieve
equally narrow results. Such a fact enables us better to understand what
Quentin Skinner calls "the use of the relevant sentence by a particular
agent on a particular occasion with a particular intention (his intention)
to make a particular statement."
20
The case of the writs of assistance suits these needs well. 21 It does so
because in it Otis, as principal attorney, and Oxenbridge Thacher, as co-
counsel, addressed themselves directly to the issue of what was, as well
as what was not, constitutional. In Otis' words, as recorded by John
Adams,
This Writ is against the fundamental Principles of Law. The
Priviledge of House. A Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House,
as a Prince in his Castle....
Otis, more specific, added,
As to Acts of Parliament. An Act against the Constitution is void:
an Act against natural Equity is void: and if an Act of Parliament
should be made, in the very words of this Petition, it would be void.
The executive Courts must pass such Acts into disuse. 8 Rep. 118.
from Viner. Reason of the Common Law to control an Act of
Parliament.
22
More than half a century later, in a letter of 29 March 1817 to his
old colleague William Tudor, Adams reflected on this episode and
commented that "then and there the child Independence was born. In
fifteen years, namely in 1776, he grew up to manhood, declared himself
free.123 Since Adams was referring to Otis' argument about statutes
contrary to the constitution being void, and since the newly independent
states in the 1780s drafted firm substantive limits on legislation, it has
been well nigh impossible to resist interpreting Adams' observation as
an indication that Otis was making the first declaration of what later was
embodied in the American Constitution and Bill of Rights as "substan-
tive due process."
But too much should not be read into Adams' recollection, and it
19. Adams, Diary, supra, note 2, vol. 1, p. 335; P. Shaw, The Character ofjohn Adams
(New York, 1876), p. 62.
20. Q. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas" (1969), 8 History
and Theory 3 at 37 [hereinafter Skinner].
21. Petition of Lechmere (1761), most fully available in Adams, Legal Papers, supra,note
11, vol. 2, p. 106.
22. Id., p. 127.
23. J. Adams, The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States, 10vols.,
ed. C. Adams (Boston, 1850-1856), 10:248 [hereinafter Adams, Works].
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should not be taken out of context. Few historians quote the entire
sentence mentioning the "child Independence" (with its implicit distinc-
tion between childhood and maturity), and fewer still observe that in his
letter he made no mention of the legal arguments of that day in court.
However, Adams did address those legal arguments in a later and less
celebrated letter to Tudor. Turning to the law on 6 August 1818, Adams
recalled that the point of law being argued was not any higher law but
rather the narrow question of whether the Massachusetts Bay Superior
Court of Judicature "had all the powers of the exchequer in England,
and consequently could issue warrants like his Majestys court of
exchequer in England." The point was one of procedure, not the
substance of the law, and the problem was one of interpreting statutes.
As he explained to Tudor in apology for quoting so extensively from the
wordy and convoluted statutes in question, "However tedious and
painful it may be for you to read, or me to transcribe any part of these
dull statutes, we must endure the task, or we shall never understand the
American Revolution. 24
It is not only improper readings of Adams' remarks that have led
scholars astray in interpreting what Otis was saying in 1761, for Otis
himself contributed to the problem with his pamphlet of three years
later, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved. There, it
is more clear that Otis was referring to the more modern doctrine of a
higher law, a body of substantive principles, nullifying statute. Some
caution, however, is in order, for whatever Otis wrote in 1764 can not be
extrapolated back in time to 1761. Obviously, there is a great difference
between a courtroom pleading and a widely distributed political
treatise. The distinction is not merely an academic one limited more to
rhetoricians than to constitutional scholars. Even if it were, Otis must be
seen as belonging to both groups. In 1760 he published his first work,
entitled The Rudiments of Latin Prosody with a Dissertation on Letters
and the Principles of Harmony in Poetic and Prosaic Composition.
Well aware of rhetorical convention, he knew and obeyed the rule that
certain styles of argument suited particular needs and were out of place
elsewhere. When he published his Vindication of the Conduct of the
House of Representatives of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay in
1762, he took note of the difference between two different styles of
argument analogous to the difference between addressing the public and
addressing the court:
It may not be amiss to observe, that a form of speech may be, in no
sort improper, when used arguendo, or for illustration, speaking of
the King, which same form might be very harsh, indecent, and even
ridiculous, if spoken to the King.
25
24. Id., pp. 338-343.
25. J. Otis, Vindication, p. 25.
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Regardless of convention, much had changed between 1761 and
1764. By the latter date Parliament had removed any doubt about the
enforcement of customs regulations when it passed the Sugar Act,
providing for trial of offenders by civil law at a vice-admiralty court in
Halifax. 26 More ominous yet was talk of raising a direct revenue from
the colonies through statutes enacted without colonial representation.
Newly injected into the struggle were the issues of taxation, representa-
tion, and trial by jury; together, these called into question the monst basic
rights of the Americans as British subjects. No longer would procedural
protections suffice to protect rights that were being explicitly abrogated
in the statutes, and for this reason Otis included in the 1764 treatise a
section "Of the Natural Rights of Colonists.1
27
Hence, while it is correct to refer to Otis' 1764 position as including
natural or higher law philosophy, 28 it is much less accurate to refer to his
1761 pleading as "'higher law' in something like the sense used by
modern constitutional theorists. '29 Such an attribution of ultimate
historical significance to an early statement suggests what is known as
the fallacy of "prolepsis" in which the later significance of an idea is
confused with its actual content and with the actual intention of the
person using it at a particular time for a particular purpose. 30 Had Otis
been making such a "higher law" argument in 1761, it is highly unlikely
that his opposing counsel-and former teacher-Jeremiah Gridley
would have seemed quite as pleased as he did with Otis' performance.
According to John Adams' reminiscence,
It was a moral spectacle, more affecting to me than any I have since
seen upon any stage, to see a pupil treating his master with all the
deference, respect, esteem, and affection of a son to a father, and
that without the least affectation; while he baffled and confounded
all his authorities, and confuted all his arguments and reduced him
to silence.
Adams described the reaction of the conservative, traditional Gridley in
the following words: "Mr. Gridley seemed to me to exult inwardly at the
glory and triumph of his pupil."3'
In short, Otis did not intend to assert, nor did his listeners infer, any
radically new "higher law" argument in 1761, for such ideas were not
26. 4 Geo. 2, c. 15.
27. J. Otis, Rights, p. 4 3 6 , printed in full, with original pagination, in Bailyn, Pamphlets,
supra, note 6. On the sharp change in constitutional debate occurring at this time, see
D. Lovejoy, "'Rights Imply Equality': The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in
America, 1764-1776" (1959), 16 William & Mary Quarterly, third series, 459.
28. Bailyn, Pamphlets, supra, note 6, pp. 100-102, 412.
29. Adams, Legal Papers, supra, note 11, vol. 2, p. 119.
30. On prolepsis, see Skinner, supra, note 20, pp. 23-24.
31. Adams, Works, supra, note 23, vol. 10, pp. 327, 343.
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needed then. Even a year later, in the contest between the House and the
governor over the latter's appropriation of funds without legislative
approval, Otis did not use them. Such an action of the governor, he
wrote, "In the nature and reason of the thing, should seem to be limited
by some usage or custom, if not by something more explicit." 32 While all
proofs of this sort are circumstantial, they do at least show that the
context of, and response to, his arguments suggest their non-radical
quality. Rather, it is submitted here, Otis' arguments were so positively
and broadly supported in 1761, and his popularity "without bounds,"
precisely because they were not radical. The great and nearly uniformly
enthusiastic reaction of the Boston community in 1761, especially seen
in contrast to the divided and confused reaction to his pamphlet in 1764,
suggests that Otis was tapping the deep tradition of jealously guarded
constitutional protections as provincial Bostonians saw them. Neither
Otis nor Adams was yet ready for an innovative argument in 1761. Had
Otis made such a plea at that point, Gridley or Hutchinson would have
noticed and remarked on it.33
The suggestions from external evidence are supported by an
examination of the internal evidence of the text of the arguments them-
selves. That inquiry goes far toward revealing the essentials of pre-
revolutionary constitutionalism and the common fund of understand-
ing about law held by mid-century Americans. To do so, the inquiry
must analyze the text in its own time and place, understanding the
conventions of language of the time, and seeing the text as having been
produced for specific targets. At the centre of the case was the legality of
general search warrants. These writs of assistance were to give effect to
statutes of 1660, 1662 and 1696 enforcing the navigation Acts.34 Unlike
special warrants, they were not limited by time or by a designation of a
place to be searched. Five such writs had been issued in Massachusetts
Bay between 1755 and 1761, but their legality remained an open
question. Thomas Hutchinson, who as lieutenant governor and chief
justice of the Superior Court of Judicature would uphold their legality
in the 1761 case, had advised Governor William Shirley in the 1750s that
they were probably illegal, but Shirley had issued them nonetheless, and
they remained unchallenged throughout the decade. But the writs did
32. J. Otis, Vindication, p. 31.
33. On Otis' popularity in 1761, see Adams, Works, supra, note 23, vol. 10, p. 248. On the
response to Rights of the British Colonies, see Bailyn, Pamphlets, supra, note 6, pp.
409-410.
34. Acts of 1660 (customs search warrants, 12 Car. 2, c. 19) and 1662 (power ofentry"for
preventing frauds and regulating abuses in His Majesty's Customs" 13 & 14 Car. 2, c.
11) did not mention the colonies and thus did not extend there. These provisions were
extended there by an Act of 1696 ("for preventing frauds, and regulating abuses in the
plantation trade" 7 & 8 Will. 3 c. 22). "Writs of assistance" were known as such
because of the authority given in them to customs officials to command aid in their
execution.
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not last forever; issued in the name of the reigning monarch, they ran
only until six months after his death. With the passing of George II in
1760, the writs would need renewal. In 1761, however, the merchants of
Boston were not to be as acquiescent as they had been, and James Otis
took on their case to argue against their issuance. Maintaining that the
writs were illegal, he argued that they ought not be granted as sought by
the petition of Thomas Lechmere, surveyor general of customs.35
Otis' arguments are far more famous than those of his co-counsel in
the case, Oxenbridge Thacher. Yet because Otis' points must be seen
as one element in the context of a general mid-eighteenth century
constitutionalism, Thacher's arguments also demand examination.
According to him, "The most material Question is, whether the Practice
of the Exchequer, will warrant this Court in granting" the writs. His
point was that the statute requiring the writs specified that they be
granted by an exchequer court, while in Massachusetts Bay no such
court existed. The Superior Court of Judicature, which had been
requested to issue the writs, had renounced its exchequer jurisdiction.
36
But Thacher was not making only a jurisdictional point; behind the
question of jurisdiction was another one that turned on procedure. In
England, he noted, the writ was returnable. Because the officer execut-
ing the process was later required to certify his doings before the court,
proper use of the writ was supervised by the court. In Thacher's words,
"the Custom House officers are the officers of that Court," and thus
"Under the Eye and Direction of the Barons [of Exchequer]." The
Massachusetts Bay writs, by contrast, were not to be returnable. As a
result, mid-century constitutional theory held that abuses were
inevitable without procedural accountability. If the Superior Court
could see how they were being used without accountability, and "If such
seisure were brot before your Honours," he said, "youd often find a
wanton Exercise of their Power."
37
The "wanton Exercise of Power": Thacher's attack on the lack of
procedural accountability touched a central aspect of contemporary
constitutionalism. It is important to emphasize this fact because it was
through duly followed procedure that mid-century Americans saw their
rights declared and enforced. Without having any firm sense of substan-
tive, absolute bars to protect the individual against the state, they saw
their protections in procedure. Put in terms more familiar to the eight-
eenth century, "the remedy comes before the right." Without a remedy
35. J. Quincy, ed., Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Superior Court of
Judicature of the Province of Massachusetts Bay Between 1761 and 1772 (1865, orig.
ed. New York, 1969), pp. 405-406. See note 21, supra.
36. The Court had done so in 1754 in McNeal v. Brideoak. On this case and Thacher's use
of it, see M. Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case (Berkeley, 1978), p. 302 [hereinafter
Smith]. This book is the definitive factual account of the case.
37. Adams, Legal Papers, supra, note 11, vol. 2, pp. 124-125.
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there is no right, for "right" was a legal term existing in reference to a
remedy that guaranteed it or obtained damages for its loss.
Otis followed Thacher and wasted no time in addressing the point
he saw as material: "This writ is against the fundamental Principles of
Law." He then explained that this meant "The Priviledge of House. A
Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle, not
with standing all his Debts, and Civil Prossesses of any kind." Otis was
careful to add that there were limitations on this "Priviledge": "flagrant
Crimes, and in Cases of great public Necessity," or "For Felonies an
officer may break upon Process, and oath-i.e. by a Special Warrant
to search such a House, and sworn to be suspected, and good Grounds
of suspicion appearing." 38
The principle identified here as "fundamental" and thus inviolable
by statute is the famous guarantee that a man's house is his castle. But it
must be asked whether Otis saw it as an inviolable "natural right," and
what he knew about it from his legal background. These are the sort of
questions that must be asked if modern scholars are to understand
accurately the historical meaning of the term and thereby the way in
which Acts became "unconstitutional."
The principle as stated in that form came from Semayne's Case
(1605),39 where Sir Edward Coke wrote, "That the house of every one is
to him as his castle and fortress, as well as his defence against injury and
violence, as for his repose." The facts in this case concerned a sheriff
attempting to seize from the house of a defendant property to be
appraised before delivery to a plaintiff. When the sheriff arrived at the
house, the defendant shut his door, whereupon the sheriff broke it in
order to extend (seize for appraisal) the goods. The law in this case, upon
which the decision turned and which defined the right, was a point of
procedure: quite simply, the sheriff had failed to request that the door be
opened, and his failure to observe due or proper process was therefore a
wrong. Before a sheriff breaks a door, in Coke's words, "he ought first to
signify the cause of his coming, and make request to open the doors."
Proper procedure was necessary to prevent "great damage and mischief'
or "inconvenience." Coke continued, "But the great question" of this
case was whether a sheriff, after request and denial, could force a door to
serve execution. On this there was no doubt: If he were serving the
King's process (as for felony or misdemeanor) and made proper notice
of his coming and requested entry, he could not be resisted.40
Of course, it could be argued that Otis, a provincial lawyer far from
the Inns of Court and the central courts at London, had only an imper-
fect acquaintance with Semayne; accordingly, he might have been
38. Id., pp. 125-126.
39. 5 Co. Rep. 91.
40. Id. at 93.
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familiar only with the general maxim but not with the case in all its
points and, therefore, simplistically elevated the qualified statement into
an absolute. However, internal evidence suggests otherwise-namely,
that Otis was familiar with all the facts, holdings, and dicta in the case.
The evidence is a similar point made by both Coke and Otis; it was a
minor point in Semayne, and easily overlooked, but it was a factual
situation that fitted the Boston reality of 1761 and gave meaning to the
1605 case. Coke had noted the need for proper procedure because
"great inconvenience" could result when lowly officers ("persons of little
substance") serve process in private suits. Whereas a sheriff, being a man
of substance, was presumed by Coke to be beyond the abuse of law, a
base individual such as a bailiff was not presumed to respect due
process; he might serve process improperly, for example, at night or
when the defendant was not at home. This point is central to Otis'
argurpent, where he warned of the abuses that would occur when the
writs would be handed around among the most venal and corrupt petty
officials abounding in mid-century Boston. Otis warned that "even
THEIR MENIAL SERVANTS ARE ALLOWED TO LORD IT
OVER US-What is this but to have the curse of Canaan with a witness
on us, to be the servant of servants, the most despicable of GOD'S
creation."4
1
For many years the received wisdom about Otis' argument was that
it asserted the existence of a body of principles existing above statute
and limiting it. This reasoning was based on Otis' citation of Coke's
statements in Dr. Bonham's Case which, Otis said, obliged the "execu-
tive courts" to declare void statutes that violated the constitution. It is
no longer general historical opinion to regard Coke's statement as
leading to modern constitutional notions of judicial review. Since 1938
there has been much weight to the interpretation of Bonham showing
that Coke was making no such modern argument but was rather only
construing the law in such a way as to make it conform to the common
law and not violate it-in particular, that the statute should be
construed so as to avoid the dangerous procedure of making a man a
judge in his own cause.42 Otis was making the same point with Bonham
and also did so when he took language very directly from another
seventeenth century case, that used by Lord Hobart in Day v. Savadge.43
Otis, it should be remembered, argued that "an Act against natural
Equity is void." Hobart's opinion was based on the same principle of
procedure used by Coke in Bonham, which case Hobart cited directly;
namely, that the Act on which the suit was based in Day made a man a
judge in his own cause. In Hobart's words, "Even an act of Parliament,
41. Adams, Legal Papers, supra, note 11, vol. 2, p. 142.
42. S. Thorne, "Dr. Bonham's Case" (1938), 54 L.Q. Rev. 543.
43. (1614), 80 E.R. 235.
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made against naturall equitie, as to make a man a judge in his own case,
is void in it selfe .... "44
To demonstrate the traditional and non-revolutionary character of
Otis' position, it is necessary to emphasize the procedural nature of the
protections Americans sought against arbitrary government. The main
burden of Otis' argument was one of construction. The general warrant
was authorized, Lechmere had petitioned, by the statute of 1662 which
had augmented the powers of search granted by the statute of 1660.45
According to Otis, who was once again relying on the power of a court to
interpret statutes so as to make them conform to the common law, the
earlier statute had authorized only special warrants, not general ones.
The principles of common law statutory interpretation required that
statutes be consistent; therefore, the vague words of the latter statute
had to be construed consistent with "natural equity," a term familiar to
common lawyers. It referred neither to abstract principles of fairness
nor to a body of substantive law. Rather, it referred to the doctrine of the
"equity of statutes," a method of statutory interpretation. This was an
old doctrine, fading fast in seventeenth century England, and it would be
virtually eliminated as the doctrine of parliamentary omnipotence grew
in the eighteenth. But it had a long pedigree, and Otis, drawing on
seventeenth century notions of law and the constitution, was using it in
1761. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes required that
positively worded statutes (such as the Act of 1662) were to be construed
as operating consistent with existing statute law (the Act of 1660). Such
is all that Otis was demanding here by the term "natural Equity,"
namely, that the court take the wording of the 1662 statute and, as Lord
Hobart had said, "mould them to the truest and best sense."46
Otis repeatedly cited the procedural flaws in the system of general
warrants. They were, for one thing, "UNIVERSAL," so that "everyone
with this writ may be a tyrant." They were also "PERPETUAL," and
there was no requirement that they be returned; echoing Thacher's point
about the lack of accountability, he warned that "every man may reign
secure in his petty tyranny, and spread terror and desolation around
him, until the trump[et] of the arch angel shall excite different emotions
in his soul." Moreover, the bearer of the writ could enter houses "AT
WILL" during the day and "command all to assist" him in his tyranny.47
The case at hand, then, turned on what Otis, speaking in the
44. Id. at 237.
45. See note 34 supra.
46. J. Gough, FundamentalLaw in English Constitutional History (Oxford, 1961), p. 19.
T. Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law (London, 1956), p. 50. On the
seventeenth century quality of Otis' "conceptions of power and law that had promoted
the cause of liberty in the age of Edward Coke," see Bailyn, Pamphlets, supra, note6,
p. 551.
47. Adams, Legal Papers, supra, note 11, vol. 2, p. 142.
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commonly understood conventions of eighteenth century constitu-
tionalism, called "this wanton exercise' of power, "this monster of
oppression." Rather than defending liberty against such a "monster"
with the invertebrate creature of natural law or abstract principle, Otis
had explicit and well-understood rules to show that "reason and
construction are both against this writ." These qualities were among the
basic principles of the constitution, and "AN ACT AGAINST THE
CONSTITUTION IS VOID." He emphasized, "ALL PRECEDENTS
ARE UNDER THE CONTROUL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW," or, as he elsewhere referred to them, "the fundamental Principles
of Law." Though it is possible to suggest that these "fundamental
Principles" could mean the modern idea ofjudicial review, Otis' remarks
seen in context indicate that he meant the fundamental principles of
construction, interpretation, and procedure. All of his citations, he
stated in his summation, "prove no more than what I before observed,
that special writs may be granted on oath and probable suspicion. The
Act of 7th and 8th'of William III. [1696] that the officers of the planta-
tions shall have the same powers, &c. is confined to this sense .... 4
A final, and very important, problem remains: what did Otis mean
by "void," and how were the "executive Courts" actually to "pass such
Acts into disuse"?49 The answer, it is submitted here, lies not in any early
version of judicial review, but rather in the details of how the legal
system functioned in eighteenth century Massachusetts Bay. Thacher, in
his argument, hinted at the answer when he argued that the writs of
assistance were not of that category of writs which a court was required
to issue upon demonstration of certain circumstances. There existed
other writs relating to the executive capacity of the court which (in the
words of the scholar who has studied this facet of the case most care-
fully) "were issued or not as the court thought fit."50 Thacher believed
that the writ of assistance fit neither category precisely, but he may have
been arguing that because it did not fit the former it should not be issued.
It is also important to note that the category of discretionary writ-
those that the court could issue or not as it saw fit-related to the
executive functions of the court, with the sheriff serving process.51 This
functional aspect of justice, then, is to the point: that the court could
48. Id., pp. 143-144 (emphasis added).
49. Id., p. 128.
50. Smith, supra, note 36, pp. 401-402.
51. John Adams even described the jury as being responsible for "the Execution of the
Lawes": Adams, Diary, supra, note 2, vol. 2, p. 3. The courts of provincial Massa-
chusetts Bay had many functions that today would not be regarded as strictlyjudicial
but, rather, executive and administrative. On this undifferentiated quality of those
courts, see H. Hartog, "The Public Law of a County Court: Judicial Government in
Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts" (1976), 20 American Journal of Legal History
282.
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simply refuse to execute a law that it regarded as unconstitutional. This
refusal to execute fits very well with the tradition of justice in Massa-
chusetts Bay, where process was more important than doctrine. Nor is
this judicial stance without common law precedent; Coke spoke of it
when he noted that "the law will not suffer those things to be aided or
maintained by the countenance of law, which appear to the court to be
void, against law, or insufficient. . . ." In such a situation, he wrote,
"no aid shall be granted." 52 It is a less well-known fact of the entire
episode surrounding the writs of assistance that, before the case came to
Boston, customs officials made application to the Inferior Court of
Common Pleas at Swansea for a general writ of assistance. The judges
there declined to issue them, explaining, "We thought it not Incumbent
on us by the Common Law if not Repugnant to it.' '53 What they were
saying was consistent with what Thacher had argued; namely, that the
court need not issue the writ if it did not see fit to do so. In Coke's words,
the court would grant "no aid"; in Otis' words, they would effectively
"pass such Acts into disuse."
The lack of express authority of non-exchequer courts to issue writs
of assistance was so troubling to crown officials that they finally asked
attorney general William deGrey (later Lord Walsingham and chief
justice of Common Pleas) for his opinion on the matter. Interpreting the
existing statutes, he reported that giving colonial customs officials
general warrants was not founded in law. So informed, Parliament in
1767 enacted a statute which stated the following:
no authority being expressly given by the said act [7 and 8 Gul. 3]
. .. to any particular Court to grant such Writs of Assistants for the
Officers of the Customs in the said Plantations, it is doubted
whether such Officers can legally enter Houses and other Places on
Land, to search for and seize Goods, and in the manner directed by
the said recited acts; To obviate which Doubts for the future, and in
order to carry the Intention of the said recited Acts into effectual
Execution, be it enacted, and it is hereby enacted by the Authority
aforesaid, that from and after the said [20 November 1767] such
Writs of Assistants... shall be and may be granted by the Superior
or Supreme Court of Justice having Jurisdiction within such
Colony or Plantation respectively. 54
Nonetheless, though such courts were explicitly empowered to do
so, they did not regard themselves as required to do so. Courts in every
52. Sir Edward Coke, Second Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (London,
1642), p. 248.
53. J. Frese, "James Otis and Writs of Assistance" (1957), 30 New England Quarterly 496
at 502.
54. Id., p. 506 (7 Geo. 3, c. 46).
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colony-whether Whig Massachusetts Bay or Tory Nova Scotia-
refused to issue them. 55 Their reasoning was devoid of the flamboyance
of James Otis, but firmly grounded in the procedural constitutionalism
of the eighteenth century North American colonies.
55. 0. Dickerson, "Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the American Revolution, in The Era
of the American Revolution, ed. R. Morris (1959 orig. ed. New York, 1965), p. 40, at
pp. 59-61.
